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Abstract—Data sharing on the Internet is crucial in many
aspects of nowadays life, from economy to leisure, from public
administration to healthcare. However, it implies several privacy
issues that have to be managed. Definition of appropriate policies
helps to safeguard the data privacy. This paper describes an
authoring tool for privacy policies to be applied to the healthcare
scenario. The tool exhibits two different interfaces, designed
according to specific expertise of the policy authors. It is part
of a general framework for editing, analysis, and enforcement of
privacy policies. Furthermore, this serves as a first brick for a
usability study on such tools.
I. INTRODUCTION
Healthcare organizations provide medical services to their
patients, i.e., examinations and diagnostics, and produce elec-
tronic documents concerning these services, e.g., reservations,
prescriptions, and medical reports. This arises questions con-
cerning, e.g., privacy, confidentiality, and availability of these
data. Indeed, the actors of healthcare scenario should be able to
access these data, wherever they are stored and whenever they
are needed. However, since these documents include sensitive
information, their sharing must be regulated by adequate poli-
cies to assure the privacy of patients. A privacy policy could
state, e.g., that the documents related to a given patient can be
accessed by the patient itself, by her general practitioner, and
by an emergency doctor in case of accident. These policies
can be defined by several entities having the right to restrict
the access to these data.
Although some policy languages are currently available (e.g.,
Ponder, [1], ASL [2] and XACML [3], policy specification
is still a difficult task, mainly because of the scarce user-
friendliness with these languages. This could prevent indi-
viduals from writing complex policies to define fine-grained
access rights or to frequently update these policies to fit new
needs, and patients from writing policies on their documents at
all. Hence, it is pointless to set up an enhanced authorization
system adopting a very expressive privacy policy language to
protect medical data, if the policy authors are not enabled
to edit their policies with a proper authoring tool. The quest
for a proper policy authoring tool also follows from the fact
that, besides healthcare organization professionals, patients
should be enabled to define their access constraints on their
documents. In fact, the European Directive 95/46/EC, and its
reform IP/12/46 of 25 January 2012, states the right of subjects
to define constraints on their personal data.
The goal of this paper is to present a prototype implementation
of an authoring tool for defining privacy policies and patient
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preferences, regulating medical data sharing. The tool has been
developed in an expertise-driven way, to be tailored for users
not familiar with technical policy write up, as well as for
more skilled users. It exhibits two interfaces: one addressed to
common users, a Mobile interface, the other to policy experts,
a Desktop interface. The idea behind the two interfaces is to
provide i) an easy and quick way for a common user (e.g.,
a patient) to set privacy preferences on her own document
in a few click (Mobile interface); ii) the capability to set
privacy preferences using a device of common use, such as
a smartphone or a tablet (Mobile interface); iii) a mechanism
to compose fine-grained privacy policies for skilled users
(Desktop interface) that want to set up complex privacy rules.
The tool has been developed in accordance to usability guide-
lines that will be tested in the near future through usability
studies that are setting up for the tool assessment.
The paper is structured as follows. Next section presents
the policy-based infrastructure that we propose for controlled
data access and sharing in e-health. Section III presents the
architecture of the authoring tool and focuses on the function-
alities of the two user interfaces. Section IV discusses related
work on the interdependencies between authoring tools and
usability issues. Section V concludes the paper.
II. POLICY-BASED INFRASTRUCTURE
This section describes the architecture of a policy-based
privacy infrastructure, general enough to encompass different
use cases in the e-Health privacy management scenario, and
supporting the two main phases of a policy lifetime: the i)
policy generation and the ii) policy enforcement. In the first
phase, the policy administrators at the healthcare organizations
set general privacy policies over the data they host, according
to National laws and internal organization planning. Patients
as well may express privacy preferences over their medical
data, and these preferences are translated in privacy policies.
In the second phase, instead, each time a request for accessing
a medical data is received, the evaluation of the policies
governing access to those data is executed to decide whether
the access must be granted or denied. Figure 1 represents the
architecture along with the operation workflow.
This work focuses on the policy generation, proposing an
authoring tool to enable both healthcare organization profes-
sionals and patients to compose their policies and preferences.
The policy generation phase consists of the following steps.
1. At system initialisation, the policy experts compose the
privacy policies that represent the rules stated by the health-
care organization that produces and stores the data. In some
countries, such rules are defined by public agencies and follow
Fig. 1. Policy-based Infrastructure
requirements for protecting sensitive data of private citizens
and organizations. The experts use a desktop interface that
requires some specific skills in policy specification (1a). In
real environments, policy makers set a not negligible number
of policies regulating the management and sharing of all the
data produced and stored at their healthcare organizations. To
come up with a consistent set of policies, policy experts are
supported by a validation tool, that guide them in composing
conflict-free policies (1b).
2. In the healthcare scenario the subject who produced a
document, e.g., a General Practitioner who issued an e-
prescription, is entitled to define access restrictions on this
document. Moreover, patients should also be able to set privacy
preferences on their medical documents (such requirement
is defined, for example, by the European Directive for Data
Protection 95/46/EC, and its reform IP/12/46 of 25 January
2012). In our model, we assume that, as soon as a new
medical document is produced, the patient is notified (2a),
and he can set up the privacy preferences on that document
through the mobile interface (2b). Each subject can also modify
his preferences in a successive step, by querying the medical
document repository and choosing which documents will be
the object of their privacy preferences. Obviously, patients can
express privacy preferences only on their documents and, in
general, subjects can only express privacy preferences on the
document they have some jurisdiction on.
3. Both the policies written by experts and the privacy pref-
erences expressed by patients and document issuers on their
documents are given as input to a mapper that converts them
into enforceable policies (3a and 3b). A standard and well
supported formalism for enforceable policies is XACML [3].
4. The enforceable policies are stored in the Policy Repository
(4) and they will be processed in the policy enforcement phase.
For the sake of completeness we also give a brief description
of the policy enforcement phase.
5. Different users, such as patients, administrative personnel,
doctors, and researchers at the healthcare organizations, try
to access some medical documents by formulating an access
request through a search and visualization interface (5).
6.The access request is intercepted by a Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) that temporarily suspends the request and invokes
a Policy Decision Point (PDP) (6) to evaluate the privacy
policies associated to the document whose access is being
requested. In our model, we assume that PEP retrieves the
attribute values necessary to evaluate the policy (e.g., the
requester’s credentials, as her identifier and role, and the date,
location, and time at which the request has been sent).
7. The PDP retrieves the privacy policies produced in the
policy generation phase (7).
8. The PDP evaluates the privacy policies against the access
request. In case more than one policy apply to the access
request, their results could be in conflict one of each other.
A conflict exists when at least two out of a set of policies
evaluate a different result (e.g., one policy would allow the
request, the other one would deny it). A policy conflict solver
is in charge of detecting conflicts in order to solve them (8).
9. The PDP returns the evaluation result to the PEP. Finally,
according to the evaluation result, the PEP allows, or denies,
the access request to the medical data.
III. POLICY AUTHORING
This section focuses on design and implementation of
an authoring tool specifically tailored for the creation and
management of healthcare privacy policy.
A privacy policy consists of a set of rules expressed in
terms of the four policy elements subject, object, action,
and environment. Rules may represent authorizations, if they
allow the subject to execute the action on the object in the
environment. They may also represent prohibitions, with the
obvious meaning. The policy elements are identified through
their attributes defined according to the reference scenario.
Hereafter, we consider the healthcare scenario with the fol-
lowing attributes: (i) subjects can be identified through their
IDs and Roles (e.g., General Practitioners, Specialist, etc.),
Organizations which they belong to, and Locations, i.e., phys-
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ical addresses where subjects are located at the time of the
access request; (ii) the element object is the data over which
subjects are trying to perform some action. Attributes for
such data could be their IDs, the Category, e.g., medical
or administrative data, their Owners, e.g., the patient such
data refer to, their Issuers, i.e., entities that have produced
those data, and the data Location; (iii) the environment can be
specified through the attributes Time and Date.
The architecture of the authoring tool is shown in Figure 2.
It has been designed according to the three-tier paradigm,
where the three levels are: 1) the User Interface (Mobile +
Desktop), developed in HTML and Javascript; 2) the internal
engine, made of the Server Modules, the Controller, and the
Model Module, implemented using the PHP language; and 3)
a Relational Database, developed as a MySQL database server.
The user interface, the controller, and the model module have
been designed according to the Model-view-controller (MVC)
pattern [4] which separates the representation of information
from the user’s interaction with it. The view consists of the user
interface. The controller mediates inputs converting them to
commands for the model or view. The model interacts with the
controller and the database, by querying the latter according
to which form the user fills at the interface.
The database has the following structure: Users schema, that
contains user tables linking policy subjects to their attributes,
e.g., their roles, and tables linking subject attributes to their
values, e.g., General Practitioner; Documents schema, that
contains tables linking policy objects to their attributes, e.g.,
their categories, and tables linking object attributes to their
values, e.g., medical; Places schema, consisting of tables of
environmental attributes, like time and date, and tables linking
attributes to their values; Policies schema, storing the authored
policies in a XACML-fashion language. This schema also
stores policy actions.
The User Interface actually consists of two interfaces, the
desktop one, thought for policy experts, and the mobile one, for
common users with no technical skills on policy specification.
The Desktop interface, for each policy element, retrieves the
whole set of attributes available in the Data Base interacting
with the Server Modules. The graphical interface helps the
user to combine these attributes with the proper operation
in order to produce a policy rule. The Mobile interface,
instead, retrieves a set of predefined policy skeletons, along
with a restricted set of attributes that can be exploited to
instantiate those skeletons. The policy resulting from the
choices performed by the user though the interface is stored
in the Data Base. The Desktop interface produces policies
expressed in controlled natural language, CNL4DSA [5], while
the preferences authored through the Mobile interface are
stored in the Data Base using a custom format. Then the
policies are mapped to XACML policies (step (4) of Figure 1)
and stored in the Policy Repository.
A. User Interface
The User Interface has been designed and implemented
considering that 1) users are classified according to their
expertise; 2) the interface provides different sets of features
according to the user expertise; and, 3) the interface is acces-
sible by mobile phones, tablets, and desktops. As in [6], two
users categories are considered:
Common Users, e.g., patients or doctors that produced the
medical documents, that are unaware of the constraints they
can impose on their data. These authors are driven in the
authoring phase through the Mobile Interface, that 1) is
document-centric, i.e., it allows users to compose their privacy
preferences over specific documents they own in few clicks; 2)
it offers a simple and guided way to compose such preferences;
and, 3) is accessible from smart-phones and tablets.
Policy Experts, with a high-level understanding of the policy
domain. These authors may be driven in the authoring phase
through the Desktop Interface. The policy experts are not ex-
pected to have in-depth technical knowledge of how the policy
will be evaluated and enforced, but they are familiar with
high-level policy specification languages. Examples of policy
experts are policy makers of national healthcare systems, that
assess standard guidelines for access control and usage of
sensitive medical data in their countries. The desktop interface
has been especially thought for them, since, reasonably, setting
the high level privacy policies fixed by national healthcare
systems and healthcare organisations is an activity carried out
during ordinary workdays.
1) Mobile Interface: Some screenshots of the mobile in-
terface are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Designed for non expert
people, possibly ignoring technical aspects of policy specifica-
tion, its design is minimalist, to reduce the cognitive load of
the user. Commands are grouped in a sliding panel on the left
side of the screen, see Figure 3 a). The menu is retractable to
leave space to the content that, in this way, appears not to be
crushed and it is usable at different resolutions. The bar at the
top of the screen allows the user to return to the homepage
and to previously visited pages, and to open the panel menu
(on which there is the logout button).
The Mobile Interface is document-centric because it allows
the user to set privacy preferences on documents by firstly
selecting such documents. Filling the form in Figure 3 a), the
user obtains a list of the documents for which she is allowed
to edit access preferences. In particular, patients are allowed
to set the access preferences of their medical document,
while doctors are allowed to set the access preferences of the
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document they produced. The visualization of such list can
be constrained by requiring to visualize only those documents
issued within a certain time interval, or on a certain date, or of
a certain category (e.g., only radiological reports). Constraints
on how to visualize the document list are enacted by selecting
specific values from an autocomplete input.
Pairing users with the list of documents available to be
visualized is possible through a two-step phase of authenti-
cation and authorization. First, a user logs into the interface
by presenting her own credentials. Once logged, the system
automatically retrieves the set of profiles associated to the
user. Each profile represents a set of attributes paired with the
user. For example a given user could have two profiles: the
profile patient, which includes the role attribute, whose value
is, obviously, patient, and the profile doctor, which includes
the role attribute, with value Psychiatrist, and the Organization
attribute with value Psychiatric Hospital ABCD. The profiles
are defined by the entities that issue the users attributes. A
user with more than one profile, e.g., patient and doctor, must
choose to use the interface selecting one of them. Selecting the
profile patient, the user will be able to edit preferences only
on medical documents regarding herself as a patient. Instead,
the same user, which selects the profile doctor, will be able
to compose preferences over all the medical documents she
issued, although these documents refer to different patients.
Upon document selection, the interface shows to the user
different buttons associated to commands that encode partly
customizable authorizations. Consider a user that has the role
patient. First, she selects the document over which she may
want to compose her privacy preferences. This document
becomes the object of the policy. As an example, in Figure 3 a),
she searches and selects the medical report “Right Arm X-Ray
09/11/2012”. Then, she chooses the subjects of her policy, i.e.,
the subject to whom this rule will be applicable (see Figure 3
b), in which she can select either subjects with role General
Practitioner or Specialist). Upon subject selection, she can
further select 1) the kind of action that the subject is allowed
to perform on the object, e.g., “read”; and 2) the temporal
validity of the authorisation (Figure 4). In such a way, the
user sets the following policy: My General Practitioner can
read my medical report “Right Arm X-Ray” from 16/07/2013
to 24/07/2013, which is saved when he presses “Ok”.
Fig. 5. Desktop Interface
2) Desktop Interface: The Desktop Interface is shown in
Figure 5. It allows the editing of privacy policies in a more
complex way with respect to simple setting of privacy prefer-
ences provided by the mobile interface. Its usage is reserved
to Policy Experts (see above in this section). This interface
presents four tabs, one for each policy element (subject, action,
object, and environment), plus one tab labelled conditions. The
latter drives the user to set comparisons between attributes. For
each element, the users can select from a drop-down menu
which attributes to set and the attributes values (from another
menu). As an example, let the reader suppose that the user aims
at composing the following authorization: “The rescue team
member can read any medical report in emergency situations”.
First, she selects the subject attribute role from the drop-down
menu. Second, she selects the values for this attributes, i.e.,
rescue team member. Then, she selects the object attributes
category, plus their values, medical. The same procedure is
applied to specify action and environment attributes. To add,
or remove, an attribute for the same element, there are the plus
and minus buttons, respectively, at the end of value field.
The conditions tab allows to refine the policy by adding
comparisons between attributes of the elements that constitute
the policy. The drop down menus propose only the attributes
that have been set in the previous tabs. The resulting policy is
shown in a text box located under the tabs, and it is expressed
exploiting the controlled natural language CNL4DSA [5].
In a real environment, policy makers are supposed to set a not
negligible number of policies regulating the management and
sharing of all the data produced and stored at their healthcare
organizations. Thus, it becomes probable to have two, or more,
policies that would apply to the same access request and
return different results (e.g., one policy denies the access to
the requester, while the other policy allows it). In order to
avoid the co-existence of conflicting policies among all the
policies set by the policy makers through the desktop interface,
we support the editing phase with a methodology for policy
validation [7], aiming at detecting conflicts among a policy
set of CNL4DSA privacy policies (step (1b) in Figure 1). The
analysis process allows to detect conflicts between policies by
performing pairwise analysis over all pairs of authorisation and
prohibition clauses. The validator exhaustively simulates all the
possible access requests, under a set of contextual conditions
defined by the policy expert (e.g., she can set date and time of
the access request, role of subject, category of data, etc.). Thus,
the validator checks if there exist, at least, one authorisation
and one prohibition that, simultaneously, allows and denies the
same subject to perform the same action on the same object,
under the given set of contextual conditions. The analysis
result is showed to the policy maker through a graphical user
interface in such a way that she is able to eventually modify
some policies to avoid conflicts among them.
IV. RELATED WORK
Series of work in [8], [9], [10], [11], [6] connect policy
authoring tools with the capability of common users to use
them. In [8], the authors carry out a laboratory evaluation of a
variety of user-centric methods for privacy policies authoring,
to identify which design decisions should be taken for flexible
and usable privacy enabling techniques. Work in [9] continues
this line of research, by providing a parser which identifies the
privacy policy elements in rules entered in natural languages:
identification of such elements is a key step for subsequent
translation of natural sentences in enforceable constructs (such
as the XACML language [3]). Authors of [10] recall security
and privacy policy-authoring tasks in general, and discover
further usability challenges that policy authoring presents.
In [11], the authors present the Coalition Policy Management
Portal for policies authoring, verification, and deployment,
with the goal of providing “easy to use mechanisms for refining
high-level user-specified goals into low-level controls”. These
works show an implementation of a prototype architecture
called SPARCLE (Server Privacy Architecture and Capability
Enablement). This aims at helping privacy professionals to
create policies in natural language and translate those into
system readable commands. The interface is designed for a
desktop usage that provides a syntax guide for writing policies
in natural language. However, basic users with no technical
expertise could face some difficulties with this framework. For
that reason, the authoring tool here proposed tries to reduce
the technical skills needed to compose a policy, and offers the
mobile interface to edit a privacy preference in few clicks.
Recently, work in [6] advances the notion of templates-based
authoring tools, for users with different roles and skill sets,
as, e.g., patients, doctors, and IT administrators could be
in the e-health scenario. Thus, the authors propose different
templates to edit privacy policies, each of them needing
different user skills, and they model a prototype interface,
still not implemented. The mobile interface proposed here
allows to compose preferences that will be automatically,
and transparently, mapped into XACML, [3], the well known
language for access control policies, sufficiently general to be
put also to the purpose of privacy rules specification. Users
can set the contextual conditions, like time range or locality,
through drop-down or autocomplete inputs of a form. On the
other hand, the desktop interface helps users to write policies
using a controlled natural language (cfr. CNL4DSA [5]) that
will be transparently mapped to XACML too.
The FP7-EU project Consequence designed and developed
an integrated framework for the authoring, analysis, and
enforcement of Data Sharing Agreements (DSA), that are
formal documents regulating data exchange. The authoring tool
developed within the project was intended for users with deep
knowledge on policy specification [12], [13]. The use of a
controlled natural language (CNL4DSA) and the insertion of
a help-on-line facility partly mitigate usability issues, whose
complete solution needs however further investigation. Further-
more, the Consequence authoring tool does not allow multi-
party definition of policies. On the contrary, the architecture
of the authoring tool presented in this paper allows different
users to write policies. Whenever an access request is sent,
all the policies that can be applied are taken into account and
evaluated at run-time in such a way to solve conflicts among
them (by exploiting, e.g., the conflict detector engine provided
by the XACML framework, as well as strategies for conflict
resolution, such as the ones proposed in [14], [15], [16]).
From a business perspective, Axiomatics offers a desktop
interface for policy authoring [17]. The GUI provides support
to IT administrators with relevant technical skills to edit
XACML policies. From a social networking perspective, work
in [18] presents a collaborative authoring tool, allowing several
individuals to specify policies over data published on social
networks, and whose disclosure may affect their privacy. The
authors acknowledge some usability issues in their prototype
implementation, and future work are foreseen towards a user-
friendly authoring interface. The proposed tool approaches the
problem from a different prospective. Indeed, the interface
allows users to write policies on own data by the setting of
an authorization to other users and without involving their
data (data centric model). Furthermore, different entities that
specify policies on a same data are unaware of the existence
of policies written by others. All the policies are analyzed at
run-time after each access request to the data.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented the prototype of an expertise-
driven authoring tool for privacy policies, specifically tailored
for the healthcare scenario. The mobile interface of the tool
allows common users, such as patients, to edit their privacy
preferences for a controlled management of their medical data.
The desktop interface, instead, is specifically developed for
policy makers that set up general policies, as dictated, e.g.,
by national healthcare institutions. As ongoing work, a series
of tests to verify the tool usability are being set up. We are
currently selecting people with different expertise to carry out
the tests. User feedback for refining the authoring tool and
improving the user experience are the expected outcome of
the testing phase. We plan to integrate the authoring tool into
a policy-based infrastructure described throughout the paper.
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